Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Terminology: This section explains special features of the language used by the individual authors. _____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Steven E. Boer on Terminology - Dictionary of Arguments
I XI TI/Boer: Thesis: Believe as a 2-digit relation to a special kind of property ("thought content"). Spelling: German writing (fracture). --- I XI Stock: Relation theory: Boer pro: belief as a relation to thought content (certain property) STI/Boer: Semantics for belief attribution, which considers substitutional opacity in belief reports as a genuine semantic feature. Thesis: these two together solve many known puzzles. Object-dependent senses/Frege/Boer: these are to be defended here (Boer pro Frege). --- I 6 Participating/Participation/Boer: a thing that does not participate in the world is either e.g. a non-existent thing or a non-space-time individual, a non-existent or false proposition, a non-existent or non-persisting state, a non-existent or unexplained property or relation, or a non-existent or non-occurring event. So more precisely: (D2) R is a participation-independent relation = it is possible for an existing thing to have a relation R to a thing that does not participate in the world. E.g. mental reference: would then be intentional simply because one can think of abstract as well as of concrete individuals (also unexemplified properties, etc.). Relation/Participation/Boer: although a tolerant actualist who acknowledges the existence of relations at all, accepts that some relations are participation-independent, the relation of such relations is not limited to existing things. (D2) only requires that an existing thing has such a relation to a non-participating thing. Relation R: from the fact that someone has R to something does not follow that this something participates in the world ((s) one can think of abstract objects). Non-existence: if there are non-existent things, there is nothing in (D2) that forbids one to have a participation-independent relation like mental reference to them. ((s One can think of something non-existent) That at most will be rejected by a very strict nominalism. --- I 12 Notation/Boer: N: be an entity of a given type (E: spelling in the book: black letter) EN: be the essential property of things of this type N iff --- I 13 i) EN can be exemplified (i.e., that there may be such a thing) ii) necessary: a thing exemplifies EN iff it is identical to N. Haecceitas: of N. the property to be N. This would be trivially the essence of N. --- I 13 Definition normal/terminology/Boer: if we wanted to name things for which it is possible that they exist/that they are actual. Definition abstract/terminology/Boer: be a thing for which it is not possible that it exists/is actual. Fiction/fictitious/Boer: a) in the first sense: (mere Possibilia): normal, if non-existent. b) as essentially fictional: abstract._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |